choices without a full knowledge of the facts or understanding of the possible outcomes and consequences of their actions. People's futures are also affected by the actions of others; often this is unexpected, and they have little control over it. The same situation applies to groups and organizations.
People and organizations become aware of uncertainty when they become aware of things that they do not know but they feel they need to know for some reason. Often this reason is to make decisions and to take action about the future. John Dewey (1929) explores the links between uncertainty, knowledge, and action inThe Quest for Certainty. He says what makes uncertainties real or relevant for people are the consequences or different possible outcomes that flow from them and their implications for action (p. 38) . This aspect of uncertainty being relevant to action is expressed by Donald Schon (1982, 291) as follows: "A situation is uncertain when it requires action but resists analysis of risks."
Economists such as Ruth Mack (1971) make a distinction between risk and uncertainty. Uncertainty is a broader concept and encompasses risk. She expresses the difference as follows:
Risk is present when two or more states of the world are possible and the assignment of the probability of each can be made with confidence . . . . Uncertainty characterizes . . . cases where information is inadequate and observation disorderly . . . deep uncertainty implies that both inferential (logical causes) and experimental (observations) bases of knowledge are poor. (P. 29)
Mack defines uncertainty as follows: "Uncertainty is the complement of knowledge. It is the gap between what is known and what needs to be known to make correct decisions" (p. 1). The notion of "correct decisions" is, of course, relative, and different individuals and groups will bring different values and perceptions to bear. There is a paradox here too. If the uncertainty gap were reduced to zero, then the future would be clear or determined and there would be no need to make any decisions or do any planning. The notion of a decision implies the future is not predetermined, different outcomes are possible, and some uncertainty will always be present (Shackle 1969) .
The concept of uncertainty involves something being known or unknown by an individual or by a social group. Therefore, there are individual and social process dimensions to the perception of risk and uncertainty (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) and to decision making under uncertainty (Kahneman and Tversky 2000) . Audi (1999, 129) says that "certainty" means "being certain, which is either a psychological property of persons or an epistemic feature of propositionlike objects" or arguments. A person is certain about a proposition if the person has no doubt that the proposition is true, and thus "a person can be certain regardless of the degree of epistemic warrant for a proposition." The social process aspects of knowledge and uncertainty are very relevant for individual and group action and for organizational and public planning, because people and groups involved have to perceive, communicate, and try to agree about the issues and the uncertainties to take action. There will be different views about whether this perception is warranted, based on the available evidence and arguments presented. John Friedmann (1987, 43) emphasizes this social construction of knowledge and uncertainty: "All empirical knowledge-scientific and technical as well as personal-is validated . . . by talking about the evidence. The construction of knowledge must therefore be regarded as an intensely social process, with its own interpersonal and group dynamics." Talking and agreement about uncertainty, through a social process, does not necessarily remove it and may increase it or reduce it (Kahneman and Lovallo 2000) .In this article, I will define uncertainty as follows:
Uncertainty is a perceived lack of knowledge, by an individual or group, that is relevant to the purpose or action being undertaken.
People and organizations continually live with uncertainty-but in making decisions and taking actions, they try to find out what they need to know and do to achieve their desired outcomes; that is, they try to link the present to the future with certainty. Ruth Mack (1971) makes the general argument that not understanding and dealing with uncertainty in decision making has costs. These may be in the form of less desirable or unforeseen outcomes, negative impacts, or lost opportunities. She puts it as follows: "Uncertainty deteriorates the results of most purposive procedures relative to what they would be if all the relevant information were readily available" (p. 2). Other writers have stressed that some irreducible uncertainty and chance events are inherent in any situation of choice about the future and that this cannot be eliminated (Shackle 1969; Van der Heijden 1996) .
᭤ Uncertainty and Planning
Planning is a form of decision making by individuals and organizations that generally involves more complex situations, a longer time frame for actions and outcomes, and more prior thought about alternative choices and their consequences. Planning by organizations also involves a framework for implementation. Therefore, the effects of uncertainty are likely to be more significant and important to take into account. But planning can also provide a structured social process for trying to understand and manage uncertainty about the future and in the future. Peter Marris (1996, 132) says, "Nations, regions, cities, neighborhoods all make plans to secure their physical, social and economic future . . . that there have been so many attempts at collective . . . planning . . . confirms the attraction of collaborating against uncertainty."
Uncertainty about the future is not the only relevant uncertainty for planning. Many aspects of the past and present may not be known or are uncertain, particularly from the point of view of a particular individual or group. These include information about past events, information about the current environment, and the views and intended actions of other individuals or groups. Aspects of the past or present may also need to be "forgotten" or relearned before individuals and groups can think about the future (Baum 1999) .
This article focuses on public planning, and in particular regional planning, in which governments and community organizations plan for the future of a geographical region and for sectors of the social environment, such as transport and land use. Organizations and processes set up to do public planning exist within the context of a social environment. This environment is constantly changing, and the planning process constantly interacts with the social environment. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . The term social is used here in the widest sense to include the physical, ecological, economic, and human aspects of the environment. Many writers about planning have argued that the social environment is changing faster and becoming more complex and turbulent and this has implications for planning processes and practice (Emery and Trist 1965; Bryson 1988; Christensen 1999) . Emery and Trist (1973, xi) argue that greater uncertainty and complexity in the environment creates "greater difficulties for processes of planning and the consideration of alternative futures." This article explores why this is so.
Uncertainty is created by the changing social environment or planning context. However, the planning process itself also creates uncertainties for the groups and individuals involved. Judith Gruber (1994) has studied regional growth management processes involving multiple levels of government, agencies, and the community. She says that when these groups first come together, "it is in a situation of great uncertainty about the interests and intentions of other participants, about the problems to be resolved, and about possible vehicles for solution. This uncertainty . . . poses a significant impediment to cooperation" (p. 3). It is important to make this distinction between uncertainty arising from the environment and uncertainty arising from planning because while uncertainty in the social environment is perceived (to varying degrees) by everyone in that environment, uncertainty in the planning process is only perceived by people and organizations actively involved in the process. This is the uncertainty that planners, particularly, have to understand and manage.
Uncertainty in the social environment and uncertainty in the planning process are closely linked but distinct. I have called the first environmental uncertainty, or "uncertainty for planning," and the second process uncertainty, or "uncertainty from planning." Just thinking about the future, or trying to predict or adapt to the future, creates uncertainties for all people and organizations in a region: this is environmental uncertainty. Public planning is a process for changing the future that involves constructing and considering alternative futures, and this can create much greater feelings and perceptions of uncertainty. In planning, an organization or group has to imagine possible futures, agree about a desired future, and identify and decide on policies and actions to create this future. But "the further out in time the projected future is, and the more different it is to the present, generally the more uncertainty it creates for the group trying to plan and decide now" (Abbott 2000, 84) : this is process uncertainty. These concepts will be illustrated by reference to the SEQ 2001 regional planning project (see Figure 2) . SEQ 2001 commenced in 1990 in a period of heightened population growth in what has been the fastest-growing metropolitan region in Australia for the past twenty years. Coupled with political changes and a lack of knowledge about the impacts, this accelerated growth created "tension . . . [and] instability" in the community (Minnery 2001, 38) and thus a high level of environmental uncertainty. This widespread community concern about an uncertain future led to governments agreeing to establish SEQ 2001 as a "collaborative planning" process that would involve all three levels of government (local, state, and commonwealth) and the community (Margerum 2002, 179 or how to get the disparate groups to work together to create one" (Minnery 2001, 28) , and this created process uncertainty for the people and organizations involved.
᭤ Linking the Past, the Present, and the Future
To understand environmental and process uncertainties, it is necessary to understand what links the past and the present to the future because these links create the dimensions of change and uncertainty and the logical basis for planning.
While situations and things in the past can be known, the future does not exist and cannot be known in the normal sense of that word. John Friedmann (1987, 42) asks, "What assumptions must be made . . . in order to claim that knowledge of events in the past is relevant to 'knowing' the future?" Part of the answer is that we assume that processes that have linked events in the past to the present will continue to link the present to the future. The natural and social processes that link past, present, and future situations are numerous, and Mack (1971) says, "The relevant labyrinths of causality are endless and particular to each situation." However, she goes on to say that the "following four categories of causal factors [are] commonly present" (pp. 67-69):
• the basic internal dynamic-the intrinsic causal relationships in the situation, including physical, economic, and social relationships;
• the external influences-this means the external physical, economic, and social environment of the situation and how it relates to and influences the situation and the future outcomes;
• the human factors and strategies-human behavior is both part of the situation and of the external influences that affect it. It can be difficult to predict and people may support or oppose a desired result. This factor relates to both individuals and organizations; and
• chance-many situations will be influenced by unpredictable one-off chance events. However, Mack (1971, 68) notes that "truly unknowable random elements are likely to be compounded with a great deal of residual ignorance about processes that are theoretically subject to understanding." These factors are illustrated in Figure 3 .
Taking the situation of a growing urban region, many things that existed in the past and exist now will continue to exist in the future, but in a modified form. These include the natural topography, regional ecosystems, parts of the built environment, people, organizations, and community values.
The relationships and processes of causation and change that link these things through time are fully or partly known or agreed theories about them exist. Developing understanding of these links and processes by scientific methods is what Dewey (1929, 136) calls "experimental knowing." Organizational and public plans are also things that exist now that affect the future. All of these fall into various categories of change, as shown in Table 1 . As the table indicates, over the short term (less than five years), many things do not change much, or the processes are understood, and therefore they provide context and a reasonably high level of predictability for short-term urban programs and plans. However over a longer period (twenty-plus years), the number of things that are variable and unpredictable rises greatly. In terms of Mack's (1971) four categories, this is because of the following:
• the outcomes of causal relationships exhibit more variability and the effects of interactions and complexity in the system become more important;
• there is greater change in the external environment, which impacts on the urban region;
• the cumulative effects of interacting individual and organizational decisions become more significant; and
• the likelihood and effects of large and small chance events is much greater.
Thus, longer-term prediction and planning is difficult and the outcomes more uncertain.
If planning is about changing the expected future, then it is about understanding and changing these links between the present and the future. Friedmann (1987, 11) describes planning as "a forward- Environmental uncertainties are those uncertainties about the expected future experienced by everyone. The planning process is trying to explore different futures and to influence the links between the present and a desired future by preparing and implementing a plan. Doing this creates process uncertainty for those people and organizations actively involved. The dimensions of environmental and process uncertainties overlap, and these will now be explored in more detail. 
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Category of Change Example
Things that don't change much (in less than twenty years) Natural topography; drainage patterns of an area (even these are subject to change from "acts of God" such as large earthquakes and floods)
Things that change slowly in accordance with generally known natural laws and processes and urban pressures (in less than five years) Regional ecosystems; overall water quality; overall air quality Things that change slowly in accordance with broadly known social and group processes, including public plans (in less than five years) 
᭤ Environmental UncertaintyUncertainty for Planning
The nature of the social environment, how it is changing over time, and its likely future states are uncertain. Individuals, organizations, and planning processes need to respond and manage their affairs in relation to this changing social environment and consequent environmental uncertainty. Urban and regional planners have generally underestimated the amount of uncertainty in the environment in which they are working (Christensen 1999) . Organizational and business theorists, however, have paid "particular attention" to environmental uncertainty (Milliken 1987, 133) and its implications for decision making and planning.
The nature of social environments and the relationship of individuals and organizations to their environments have been studied using concepts and models arising from "systems theory." The general conclusion is that, to survive, an individual or organization needs to interact with the changing social environment and to continually adapt to it (Emery 1981) . The notion of organizations as adaptive social structures that are in a dynamic relationship with their external environment has been recognized in sociology and social psychology for many years. To survive, organizations have to maintain a balance between their stability and their flexibility to change in response to changing external circumstances (Selznick 1948; Weick 1969) . Recent organizational theorists have expressed this adaptive and dynamic relationship as achieving "congruence, or fit, between external and organizational factors" (Mintzberg 1994, 36) . Social environments are perceived by many organizational writers to be changing faster and becoming more complex and uncertain, and they have proposed terms like turbulent (Emery and Trist 1965) and truly ambiguous (Courtney, Kirkland, and Viguerie 1999) to describe them.
In a rapidly changing environment, theorists have argued that uncertainty is so great that the only sensible approach for an organization is one of adjustment in incremental steps as the environment changes (Lindblom 1959) or that the organization's strategy should "emerge" as events and decisions unfold in the wider environment (Mintzberg 1994) . Others propose a more proactive approach and argue that there are degrees of predictability and uncertainty in the social environment that can be analyzed and understood. Kees Van der Heijden (1996) identifies three categories of uncertainty: risks-where probabilities are known; structural uncertaintiespossible events where known causal relationships give an indication of likelihood; and true unknowables. These categories allow for plausible future scenarios to be constructed and for organizations to test their fit with these and thus to learn and adapt more quickly. This "scenario planning" approach identifies critical causal forces and uncertainties in the environment (Van der Heijden 1996) . One method, called SEPT, analyzes the environment in terms of social, economic, political, and technological trends and uncertainties (Wilson 1998 ). Mack's (1971, 67-69) four categories of factors that link the present situation to the future, as discussed previously (Figure 3 ), also provide a framework for thinking about uncertainties and future states of the environment. Each of the four factors provides a dimension of environmental uncertainty, as follows:
• causal uncertainty-uncertainty about the basic causal relationships (physical, economic, and social) in the situation;
• human and organizational uncertainty-the actions and future intentions of other people and organizations in the situation are difficult to predict;
• external uncertainty-uncertainty about the wider social environment and how it relates to and influences the situation; and
• chance uncertainty-truly unknowable one-off chance events will also affect the situation. This is the framework for environmental uncertainty that will be explored in this article.
The "external uncertainty" dimension raises the issue of the boundary between an organization, its local environment, and a wider social environment. Van der Heijden (1996, 6) says to understand environmental uncertainty, it is critical to distinguish between the following: the organization itself; the transactional environment-that part of the environment in which the organization is a significant player; and the contextual environment-which may have a significant impact but where the organization has limited influence.
In the context of systems theory, the planning process can be seen as an organization, or a set of linked organizations, that needs to adapt to its changing social environment as shown earlier in Figure 1 . The idea of boundaries within the social environment can be readily applied to urban and regional planning, which involves planning for the future of an urban area or region. I have called this area to be influenced and planned for the planning environment to distinguish it from the external environment, as shown in Figure 4 .
Regional planning involves many organizations, and determining clear boundaries between the planning process and the planning environment can be difficult (Minnery 2001, 31) . Determining the boundaries between the planning environment and the external environment can also be difficult. However, the planning process needs to take account of uncertainty in both these parts of the environment. Uncertainty in the planning environment will generally be the most relevant and the easiest to understand. However, uncertainty in the external environment also needs to be taken into account. Sudden changes in the global environment, such as the recent 
᭤ Environmental Uncertainty for SEQ 2001
In the SEQ 2001 project, the spatial boundaries of the planning environment were defined in 1990 as the area of Local Governments making up the South East Queensland Regional Organization of Councils (SEQROC) (then twenty, and now eighteen councils). SEQ (see Figure  2 ) is a metropolitan region of 2.4 million people. It is centered on the state capital of Brisbane and also includes major urban areas at the Gold and Sunshine Coasts. In terms of planning issues, the planning environment was not well defined at the start of the SEQ 2001 process. It was understood to be about regional growth management and included land use and social issues, but not the regional economy (Abbott 1995) .
In 1990, SEQ was experiencing rapid population growth, driven by strong in-migration from interstate and overseas. This in-migration was the main factor in the external environment that was influencing the region. While there was some understanding of the competitive advantage factors behind this migration, there was "no certainty" these would be maintained and thus whether inmigration would continue at the same high levels (Stimson 1992, 54) . Within the planning environment of the SEQ region, there was a culture of growth being led by competing private sector developers opening up new low-density residential estates on the urban fringe. Local councils competed with each other to maximize their share of this development. This form of growth was perceived by residents to be threatening the region's "way of life and environmental values" (Minnery 2001, 38) . However, there was little hard information about the state of the environment in SEQ and about the actual impacts of rapid population and urban growth. In late 1989, a new state government came to power. It was an unknown quantity but did promise leadership and a consultative approach to urban planning and to government generally (Low Choy and Minnery 1994) . For the public and media commentators, there was little understanding of where this was all heading, but there was a high level of concern and a strong view that growth and development were "out of control" (Abbott 2001, 115) . In other words, in 1990, the community of SEQ was experiencing a high level of environmental uncertainty. The dimensions of this are summarized in Table 2 .
By the end of 1995, a new regional plan had been endorsed by all levels of government called the SEQ Regional Framework for Growth Management 1995 (Regional Coordination Committee [RCC] 1995). Work to prepare the new plan meant that the impacts of population growth were better understood and managed and also that councils were working more cooperatively. This reduced causal and organizational uncertainty. However, uncertainty about external migration was still high, and the unexpected (chance) election of a new state government in early 1996 raised organizational uncertainty about its intentions (Abbott 2000) . These dimensions of environmental uncertainty in 1996 are summarized in Table 2 .
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᭤ Process UncertaintyUncertainty from Planning
Everyone experiences environmental uncertainty about the expected future. However, people and groups who are actively involved in the planning process need to consider and try to agree about a desirable future and about how to get there, that is, about ends and means. In doing this, they experience additional uncertainty. Karen Christensen (1999, 141) says that "planners frequently confront" uncertainty over ends and means and they find this "disturbing and unstable." This uncertainty arising from planning is process uncertainty, and it is an inherent and normal part of planning that planners have to deal with.
There has been little recent empirical research on the perception of process uncertainty by people involved in planning. In a classic study in the 1960s, John Friend and Neil Jessop (1969) closely observed decision-making and planning processes for four years at Coventry City Council in England. They considered that planning is best viewed as "a process of decision-making under uncertainty" or what they called "strategic choice" (p. 97). They examined how uncertainty is perceived in practice by local government officers and politicians and what the dimensions of this uncertainty are. Friend and Jessop identified three dimensions of uncertainty affecting the process of decision making (and gave them abbreviations), as follows (pp. 106-7):
• uncertainties in knowledge of the external environment-UE;
• uncertainties about appropriate value judgments-UV; and • uncertainties about future intentions of people and organizations in related fields of choice-UR.
Each of these dimensions leads to calls for different types of action to address the uncertainty, as shown below.
Type of Uncertainty Leads to Calls For
UE
"More research"-more information and analysis of the environment (physical, economic, and social) UV "More policy guidance"-from the elected politicians UR "More coordination"-need to widen the field of decision Friend and Jessop (1969, 95) found there were many competing views and choices about what areas of uncertainty were the most important to investigate, manage, and reduce. In reality, possible actions to fully address these three classes of uncertainty were constrained by time, financial resources, and other resources, and this led to difficult choices in planning practice. Friend and Hickling (1997) have continued to develop the strategic choice approach to planning based on these insights. Friend and Jessop (1969) focused on the values of elected politicians. However, my own research about local action planning, also in Coventry, indicated that the values and aspirations of a local community for their area may be unknown and can be very different from the values of elected politicians, especially those representing a larger area (Abbott 2000) . The community does not just mean local residents: it can also mean community organizations, businesses, and even tourists to an area. Addressing this uncertainty about community values leads to calls for "more community participation" in the planning process (Abbott 2000, 82) .
If the dimensions of process uncertainty experienced by people involved in planning, and identified by Friend and Jessop (1969) , are compared to the dimensions of environmental uncertainty experienced by everyone, and based on Mack's (1971) change factors, it is clear there are a lot of similarities and overlap, as shown in Table 3 .
Two dimensions of uncertainty are common: first, knowledge of the local environment and its causal relationships; and second, the future intentions of other organizations and individuals. A major difference is that process uncertainty is centrally concerned with appropriate value judgments-with understanding and including the values and aspirations of people and groups involved in and affected by planning. This raises wider issues about who should be involved in planning and about how power relations affect planning and the inclusion of values (Friedmann 1973; Forester 1989) , which 244 Abbott Friend and Jessop (1969) . b. Based on the change factors of Mack (1971) . cannot be explored here. Community and individual values are, of course, part of the social environment and influence the intended actions of people and organizations. However, they become directly important in planning in considering the desirability of alternative futures. Mack (1971) identifies two other dimensions of environmental uncertainty-chance events and uncertainty about the external environment. Generally, these are givens for planning and are thus not part of process uncertainty.
In this article, the following terms will be used to explore the five dimensions of uncertainty affecting planning: causal uncertainty, organizational uncertainty, value uncertainty, external uncertainty, and chance. The four dimensions of environmental uncertainty and the three dimensions of process uncertainty and the overlapping two dimensions that are common to both are shown in Figure 5 .
The planning process is about changing the expected future by changing the links between the present and the future. These links have been previously discussed and illustrated in Figure 3 . The similarities between this and the classic strategic planning model of Where are we now? Where do we want to be? and How do we get there? are evident from Figure 6 . In applying this model, generally an expected future is developed as well as various alternative futures as shown in Figure 7 . The planning process explores the desirability and feasibility of the alternative futures, and this creates process uncertainties for the people and organizations involved. Different futures create different perceptions of the dimensions of process uncertainty. For example, a regional transport future that involved developing a new light rail system is likely to involve considerable causal uncertainty about the feasibility of the various routes and high value uncertainty about community views on the desirability of the routes, but little organizational uncertainty for other agencies that are not affected. On the other hand, an alternative future that involved mainly new institutional arrangements, such as a new transit authority, could involve high organizational uncertainty about the responses of existing organizations, but low value uncertainty because of little perceived impact on politicians or the community. Exploration and reduction of these uncertainties is intended to lead to the identification of and agreement about a desired future.
In Figure 7 , the "expected future" reflects general community perceptions of environmental uncertainty. When planners start to explore possible alternative futures, process uncertainties arise. If environmental uncertainty is high, then process uncertainty is also likely to be high because many of the factors causing high environmental uncertainty will also exist in possible alternative futures. For example, if the likely response of a new government to the expected future is very uncertain, then its responses to alternative futures are also likely to be uncertain. Therefore, as Emery and Trist (1973) have noted, a turbulent environment makes planning and the consideration of alternative futures more difficult. Where are we now?
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Where do we want to be?
How do we get there? (LINKS) Figure 6 . Strategic planning model. Christensen (1999, 143) says that "planners must assess the actual conditions of uncertainty that characterize the particular problem they are confronting and then select a style of planning that suits those conditions." She outlines a two-by-two matrix of known versus unknown means and known versus unknown ends and, for each of these situations, proposes styles of planning response, such as programming and social learning. However, most major planning projects start off in the ends unknown/means unknown category, and all five dimensions of uncertainty outlined previously should be considered in establishing and managing an effective planning process. The dimensions of uncertainty will also change as the planning process proceeds requiring different planning responses.
In developing plans, people involved in the process explore possible but uncertain futures-they also try to identify a desired future and ways to get there and to agree about these. Dowell Myers (2001, 365) says, "The twin hazards of uncertainty and disagreement form an essential context for planning's ambitions of shaping the future." Initial agreement about environmental uncertainty or a perceived social risk can be important in initiating action or a planning process to address it (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) . Myers notes that disagreement, or difficulty in reaching agreement in the planning process, occurs because many stakeholders have "markedly different valuations" of the factors involved (p. 365).
Uncertainty and disagreement are related, and where there are high levels of process uncertainty, either about a planning outcome being achieved or about its value or desirability, there is likely to be difficulty in gaining agreement. Trying to understand and resolve uncertainty is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for conflict resolution and reaching agreement. When uncertainties have been resolved as far as possible, value differences may remain about a plan that are resolved by informal and formal political processes (Forester 1989 ).
᭤ Process Uncertainty in SEQ 2001
Community and governmental concerns about high levels of environmental uncertainty led to the establishment of the SEQ 2001 project in 1990. Over the decade from 1990 to 2000, SEQ 2001 involved five main stages-some of these increased process uncertainty and others resolved or reduced it. The stages and the associated dimensions of process uncertainty are shown in Table 4 . Summarizing and describing the process in hindsight makes it seem more logical and inevitable-in fact, it was a "roller coaster ride" (Abbott 2001, 114 ) of uncertainties and disagreements.
Community Conference and Establishing RPAG, 1990-91 SEQ 2001 commenced with a large community conference, involving more than three hundred people, in December 1990. The conference called for the development of a regional growth management strategy. However, there was no clear idea about what this "should consist of or how to . . . create one" (Minnery 2001, 28) . A high-level political group, called the Regional Planning Advisory Group (RPAG), was established in July 1991 to prepare the growth management framework within two years. When this group met, there was agreement to proceed but considerable uncertainty about a number of things, including the impacts of rapid population growth, the most important regional issues to address, the future intentions of involved organizations, the views and values of RPAG members and stakeholders, and generally about how to proceed (Abbott 2001, 116) . In other words, initially in SEQ 2001 there was a high level of process uncertainty.
Sectoral Working Groups, 1992
To address these uncertainties and information gaps, RPAG established five working groups to prepare policy papers on fifteen topics, including nature conservation, agricultural land, major centers, and transport. These groups had a wide membership, including local politicians, government officers, and community sector representatives, who had generally not worked together before. The groups focused on current trends and problems and short-term policy options, and the process was "slow . . . and at times torrid as a level of understanding and agreement . . . was built up by consensus" (Abbott 1995, 136) . This approach reduced causal and organizational uncertainty. Members of the groups also heard the views and aspirations of politicians and community groups face to face, and this reduced value uncertainty.
Preferred Urban Pattern, 1993-94 However, frustrations were building up about a "lack of direction and uncertainty of outputs" (Minnery 2001, 34) , and this led to a high-level Mid-Term Review Workshop in late 1992 (RPAG 1992) . Planners resourcing the SEQ 2001 process expressed concern about the lack of integration across policy sectors and the shortterm focus of the work and proposed a longer-term growth scenario approach to developing the regional plan. The workshop agreed to this but also wanted to test it with more detailed subregional planning-a combination of "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches (Abbott 1995, 136) .
Work on the preferred urban pattern involved developing twenty-year regional growth scenarios and then evaluating these. The scenarios included an expected future, or trend, pattern, and four alternative urban patterns based on the following variables: population distribution, employment distribution, urban housing densities, transport mode split, and location and size of major centers (RPAG 1993, 6) . Considering alternative long-term futures increased causal, organizational, and value uncertainties about the desirability and feasibility of these options (Abbott 2000) . For example, the final preferred pattern was a more compact urban pattern (compared to trend) with higher densities, higher population growth close to the Brisbane central business district (CBD), higher public transport usage, and employment growth in outer urban areas. It produced better regional outcomes across a range of evaluation criteria but raised a range of issues and concerns about overall feasibility, market acceptance of higher density living, adequacy of infrastructure in existing urban areas, likely organizational responses (particularly from developers, local governments, and transport providers), and community acceptability (RPAG 1993) . This work provided the main policy basis for the first SEQ regional plan entitled, the Regional Framework for Growth Management (RFGM) (RPAG Understanding and Managing the Unknown ᭣ 247 Variable uncertainty: unexpected change of state government in early 1996 led to a regional plan review process; government position on RFGM review unclear, leading to value and organizational uncertainty; external and regional changes and plan implementation activities have affected SEQ and led to further plan reviews; plan reviews have affected causal, organizational, and value uncertainties; updated RFGM plans agreed to in 1998 and 2000 1994). However, there was disagreement about this plan, and in the foreword, local governments noted the continuation of "many unresolved issues" relating to population distribution, housing densities, funding implications, and priorities for actions (RPAG 1994, 2) .
Subregional Planning, 1994-95 The subregional planning work, which commenced in April 1994, was intended to validate the RFGM 1994 plan at the local level and to explore and resolve the above issues and uncertainties. The three Sub-Regional Organizations of Councils (Sub-ROCs) and Brisbane City Council (BCC) set up groups to analyze issues and consult their communities about the impacts of the regional plan and to produce subregional reports and recommendations. While some new policies and actions were developed, generally this process pulled back from the preferred pattern solutions (Abbott 2001, 116) . Subregional planning reduced causal, organizational, and value uncertainties, particularly for local governments, and lead to the full endorsement of a revised regional plan, the SEQ Regional Framework for Growth Management 1995 (RCC 1995 , by all three levels of government-the first time this had occurred in Australia.
Implementing and Reviewing the Plan, 1996 Plan, -2000 Implementation of the endorsed RFGM 1995 plan commenced in late 1995 but was soon affected by environmental uncertainty and an unexpected change of state government following the election in February 1996. The RCC was instructed to review the SEQ 2001 project and the RFGM 1995. The new coalition government had historically opposed regional planning, but its views and those of its agencies in 1996 were not known. This created clear value and organizational uncertainties. Following a twelve-month planning review process, and strong support from local governments, SEQ 2001 and the regional plan were reendorsed by the state, and the economic development components of the plan were strengthened (Abbott 2001, 117) .
Between 1997 and 2000, global and national changes, regional demographic and organizational changes, plan implementation successes and failures, and associated environmental uncertainties led the RCC to initiate two further plan preview processes. New SEQ regional plans were endorsed in 1998 and 2000.
Conclusions
This review of SEQ 2001 shows that environmental uncertainty can lead to the initiation of planning processes and the review of plans and that resulting activities to explore alternative futures and policies can create or reduce causal, organizational, and value uncertainties. Environmental uncertainties arise from the environment, and process uncertainties arise from planning activities, but the dimensions overlap and interact. As Friend and Jessop (1969, 95) had noted in Coventry, the perception of uncertainties in SEQ 2001 led to calls for different types of actions to address these, but these actions were limited by the time and resource constraints of the process. The review shows that the perception and resolution of uncertainties was an important dynamic driving the planning process and thus is important in understanding and managing its progress through time. In SEQ 2001, the uncertainties and disagreements were successfully managed to achieve an endorsed plan in 1995 and to update this several times.
᭤ Pushing the Bounds of Possibility
Understanding the nature of uncertainty and the interrelationships between environmental and process uncertainty can help planners to establish and manage a planning process. Different planning theories focus on different dimensions of uncertainty. For example, transactive planning (Friedmann 1973 ) is about understanding the knowledge and values of the community and thus is about value uncertainty, whereas comprehensive rationality (Simon 1957 ) is about causal links in the environment creating long-term options and is about causal uncertainty. Different planning theories can thus provide guidance on how to understand and manage different dimensions of uncertainty. There is not scope within this article to explore this further; however, some general assertions about managing uncertainty and planning outcomes can be made. As noted, a high level of turbulence and environmental uncertainty makes the planning process more difficult. Conversely, an effective planning process in a turbulent environment can have as its main outcome increased certainty in that environment. In Cities and Complexity, Christensen (1999, 8) says that urban planners working in the intergovernmental system need to "address its complexity and uncertainty directly" and in doing so can be "more efficient in addressing their goals . . . [and] can reduce complexity and uncertainty." Trying to achieve this increased certainty is one of the main reasons why we do planning (Marris 1996, 132) . But how is this done? The task is not easy and the answer provides a paradox.
Planning is constrained by the "twin hazards of uncertainty and disagreement" (Myers 2001, 365) , and successful planning requires reducing uncertainty and getting agreement to the plan by the main participating decision makers. However, if getting agreement was the only criterion of successful planning, then short-term policies and a desired future that differed little from the current situation would not raise problems or cause much disagreement for the politicians and organizations involved. This "incrementalist" approach of making numerous small adjustments is often what happens in practice (Lindblom 1959) . Ruth Mack (1971) provides some insight into incrementalism by noting that people perceive a "cost of uncertainty" and that this influences the consideration of possible and desirable futures in planning. She says a lower value is placed on outcomes or futures that may be more desirable but are perceived to be less certain. She calls this the "uncertainty discount" and says it "often narrows the list of alternatives considered; the more uncertain ones may be discarded or not considered at all" (p. 5). One of the main costs of uncertainty, therefore, is that good options are not considered or pursued. Mack says that "in many situations there is a genuine potential to raise the bar on what is attempted . . . and how close to this ceiling is a collective able and willing to aim?" (p. 150). Dewey (1929) says ordinary people have a fear of uncertainty and will try to get "rid of it by fair means or foul": these means include a tendency to jump to conclusions and to seek simple solutions (p. 227) and are the antithesis of "intelligent action" (p. 252)-politicians involved in planning are also prone to this. Studies on the behavior and decision making of people in situations of uncertainty have noted the above twin tendencies. Kahneman and Lovallo (2000, 393) found that people and groups can be very "timid" and risk adverse in making decisions but are "bold" and overly optimistic in forecasting the outcomes of plans.
In a complex social environment, planning that only considers small proposals will have little effect in changing anything. Planning that does not consider significant change cannot be effective in reducing environmental uncertainty-to be effective, planning needs to push the bounds of possibility. Guy Benveniste (1989, 50) makes the point as follows: "effective plans are audacious." He says, "effective planning cannot be measured in terms of immediate implementation . . . [it] must also include the possibility that planners take risks, which means that they sometimes attempt more than can be achieved" (p. 235). The paradoxical conclusion is that the level of uncertainty in the planning process needs to be purposely raised by imagining and considering a range of truly alternative futures and policies before it is reduced (hopefully) through a range of activities, including consultation, communication, analysis, consensus building, and agreement. Doing this is not easy. In the SEQ 2001 process, political leadership from a new state government created a semiindependent planning body (RPAG) that did have the autonomy to explore new regional options. However, within the actual planning process, there was reluctance from local government politicians and some community sectors to move very far from the status quo (Hoban 1994, 71) . Other stakeholders, including planners working for RPAG, needed to push hard at the midterm review meeting in 1992, and overcome opposition and conflict, to get alternative long-term growth options considered. This work on the preferred pattern of urban development (RPAG 1993) raised uncertainty and disagreement to such an extent that it took a further two years of consultation and analysis before all parties could formally sign off on the regional plan in 1995 (Abbott 2000) .
Leadership by politicians and actions by professional planners to introduce more strategic options are two ways the bounds of possibility can be pushed. New computer-based analytical and consultation tools, such as the online QUEST regional sustainability model, being used in the Georgia Basin Futures Project in British Columbia, Canada (Envision 2003), can also help individuals and organizations to think about long-term regional relationships between issues like land use, transport, and air quality and to envision and evaluate alternative futures. Another way to push the bounds is by the greater participation of community groups, including marginalized ethnic groups, and committed individuals in planning processes. These groups can push the bounds by introducing new ways of seeing things, or what Innes and Booher (1999, 418) call "emancipatory knowledge," and by introducing new values and stories to challenge existing power structures (Forester 1999) .
᭤ Conclusion
Peter Marris (1987, vii) says that "the theories or metaphors by which we represent . . . categories of events and their relationships-determines the kinds of action we can envision." The concept of uncertainty is ubiquitous, elusive, and paradoxical, and especially so when considered in relation to planning. However, the concepts of environmental uncertainty and process uncertainty, and the various dimensions of uncertainty discussed in this article, can assist in understanding meanings and causative forces within the planning process and thus provide guidance for a wide range of actions to manage the process and achieve more effective outcomes.
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